INTRODUCTION
The RL10 engine is primarily used to power the Centaur upper stage in either a single engine or double engine configuration (SEC = Single Engine Centaur, DEC = Double Engine Centaur). The Centaur upper stage, in turn, was used on Atlas and Titan launchers. The RL10 engine was also used in the upper stages of the Saturn I in a six-engine cluster and Delta launchers.
The RL10A-5 engine variant was also used for the DC-X (Delta Clipper) experimental vehicle. The DC-X and DC-XA used four RL-l0A-5 rocket engines, each generating 6,100 kgf thrust. Each engine is throttleable from 30% to 100% with a burn time 127 seconds. There were 12 test missions of the DC-X and DC-XA (7 vehicle failures) before the program was cancelled. In all, the RL10 engines performed a total of 48 flight firings (12 flights x 4 engines) and nearly 5,000 seconds of flight time. These missions are not included in the launch success calculations.
LAUNCH VEHICLE FLIGHT SUCCESS
Between 1958 and 2005, 190 launch vehicles configured with RL10 engines in the upper stage were launched. Of the 190 launch attempts, twenty-two failures occurred, so launchers with RL10 upper stage engines have a flight success probability of 88.4%. Of the 22 launch failures, 8 were due to the first stage, 12 were due to the upper stage, and 2 were due to the shroud.
UPPER STAGE FLIGHT SUCCESS
A summary of the failure effects and root causes are summarized in Figure 1 . The first two columns show the final effect of the failure and the intermediate functional fault that occurred, the third column lists whether the launch system failed to reach orbit with all mission objectives met or reached a lower, unintended orbit. The component that failed and its root cause is shown in the next two columns, followed by the launch vehicle number and a short description of the failure.
Of the 12 upper stage failures, all three ignition failures lead to flight termination and vehicle destruction by the range safety officer (RSO). Three structural integrity failures occurred, two of which were caused by higher than expected loads on the vehicle. On the first Atlas Centaur vehicle, AC-1/F-1, the insulation failure was caused by higher than predicted aerodynamic forces, leading to overheating and eventual disintegration of the vehicle at T+55 seconds (before upper stage separation).
The intermediate bulkhead structural failure caused by an anomalously violent staging event resulted in failure at t=288.8 seconds, precluding the second burn. The remaining failures lead to improper upper stage conditions which eventually manifested themselves as either engine restart failures or * Component where failure was manifested. premature shutdown failures.
Of the 12 upper stage failures, 6 did not reach orbit while 6 missions still managed to reach an unintended orbit. The missions that did not reach orbit were labeled "catastrophic" failures, while the missions that reached an unintended orbit were labeled "degraded" failures. Figure 3 shows a growth curve of the upper stage failures 
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Failures by flight number
The last point in each series is not a failure and represents the current run of successes using
is not an actual failure but is used for the curve fit. In this plot, the repeated prechilling failure was removed for calculating the growth curve, but is shown for reference as a non-solid diamond. The equation of this curve is given as failure number, F = 2.95*ln(0.233x +1), where x is the flight number. The derivative of the curve gives the instantaneous failure rate, currently around 98.5%.
Figure 3: RL10 powered upper stage growth curve
A few other growth models were fitted to the data to see how they impacted reliability estimates. The logarithmic, exponential (also known as Musa or Goel-Okumoto), and Pareto models were compared. All of these models are concave growth models, not S-shaped growth models, as the failure history looks more concave than S-shaped. The differences between the concave models are in their assumptions about whether or not faults can be completely removed in the limit.
Because space launch system configurations and requirements rarely remain unchanged for long, the asymptotic reliability potential and behavior were considered a secondary effect.
Grouped estimates
To account for the non-homogeneity of the system configurations in this historical data set, different curves were fitted for each of major classes of RL10 engine derivatives. The results of this partitioning of the data were inconclusive.
Next, the launch vehicles were grouped into the following 19 vehicle configuration subsets in order to look for a relationship between failures and the introduction of largescale vehicle changes: The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of flights for each launch vehicle configuration. This is a completely different partitioning of the data from above since the same engine derivative may be used in more than one launch vehicle configuration.
Failures are clustered in the very early flights after changes are made.
The upper stage failures manifest themselves very early in a new launch configuration's flight history. Booster failures appear more distributed over flight experience, and shroud failures even later.
In this partitioning, only 11 out of 19 of the subset series had a flight history of at least 7 missions, which may affect the results. However, this highlights the reality that space launch configurations rarely remain static for long, and offers evidence suggesting that component changes do not impact reliability growth as dramatically as configuration changes. The demand for flexible, interchangeable components that can accommodate a wide range of mission and payload requirements lead to integration changes that often result in new failures being introduced. Configuration changes drive the overall system reliability despite the use of components with long, reliable histories. Thus, it is extremely important to develop reliability estimates that reflect the integration contribution. In Figure 4 , the 11 upper stage failures are partitioned by cause: knowledge-based or process-based. Here again, the repeated prechilling failure (circled) was removed for the curve fits and the last data points are not actual failures. Knowledge-based failures are those due to incomplete understanding of the environmental conditions involved or the behavior of the system under actual flight conditions, and are typically resolved by design changes (either vehicle or trajectory). Knowledge-based failures experienced by the RL10-based upper stage launch vehicles involve incomplete understanding of propellant management in zero gravity (propellant settling, sloshing, etc), the effects of a longduration coast phase, and the effects of anomalous flight conditions. misinterpretation of design specifications, ineffective verification and validation methods, or incomplete reporting policies. The RL10 engine pre-chilling failures were classified as process-based failures by this author, but it is recognized that they could also be considered knowledge-based failures. The choice of a linear curve fit for the process-based errors was made because the failures occur relatively uniformly with experience, suggesting that these types of failures are driven more by random events or constantly changing mission requirements rather than growth.
Not shown in this paper is the slope of the curve in Figure  4 . Depending on the particular growth model used, the instantaneous failure probabilities cross around the 30 th or 40 th flight. Before this cross-over point, knowledge-based errors drive the failures. After this cross-over point, process-based errors dominate the failures. This is an important point to recognize--that the nature of the dominant failures shifts as a system matures.
CONCLUSIONS
The Centaur upper stage was America's first attempt at utilizing liquid hydrogen fuel for space flight. Studying the development history of the launch vehicles that used RL10 engines in their upper stages provides a unique perspective in understanding how revolutionary systems tend to evolve. While there were many failures in the beginning, it was an area of rapid growth in knowledge. The main conclusions drawn from this historical survey are:
• The first-order problems involve incomplete understanding of the fundamental physical behavior of the system under actual environmental conditions. Many of the early failures involved leakage of cryogenic hydrogen and incomplete understanding of proper propellant management in zero gravity. These types of problems diminish over time as knowledge of the behavior of the system under typical operating conditions increases.
• The region of rapid learning (i.e. failures) occurred in the first 10-20 flights. Here, first-order problems were quickly identified and addressed. Development of the proper test facilities is a critical part of rapid growth, as was demonstrated by the rate of progress achieved for Centaur after the Plum Brook test facilities were built.
• The processed-based problems tend to involve procedural and integration processes. These faults usually occur as a result of poor quality control, poor verification, and modifications of existing fabrication processes.
• Failures often occur right after major configuration or trajectory changes are made, despite the use of mature, highly-reliable components. Configuration and trajectory changes require modifications to existing processes and expose a system using mature components to new environmental conditions (different or longer in duration) or integration procedures. Thus, both kinds of changes will introduce new processed-based and knowledge-based failure modes.
FUTURE WORK
The early development years for liquid hydrogen engines occurred during the time of the space race, when multiple efforts were being pursued simultaneously. The lessons learned from Centaur upper stage failures during this growth period were shared with and quickly leveraged by other space flight programs pursuing the use of liquid hydrogen fueled upper stage engines.
Future studies would include understanding the level of acceleration in reliability growth for other similar launchers that were developed during this time period. Characteristic growth curves of other liquid oxygenliquid hydrogen engine programs and launch systems could be developed to improve understanding of the level of benefit from heritage and application similarities.
This survey did not look at the effect that advanced development and test programs had on maturity. Improved techniques and data to support evaluations of the comprehensiveness of such programs would be of great value.
